Social hierarchy promotes the cooperation prevalence by Liang, Rizhou et al.
Social hierarchy promotes the cooperation prevalence
Rizhou Liang,1 Jiqiang Zhang,2, 3 Guozhong Zheng,1 and Li Chen1, ∗
1School of Physics and Information Technology, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an 710061, P. R. China
2School of Physics and Electronic-Electrical Engineering, Ningxia University, Yinchuan 750021, P. R. China
3Beijing Advanced Innovation Center for Big Data and Brain Computing, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, P. R. China
(Dated: September 3, 2020)
Social hierarchy is important that can not be ignored in human socioeconomic activities and in the animal
world. Here we incorporate this factor into the evolutionary game to see what impact it could have on the
cooperation outcome. The probabilistic strategy adoption between two players is then not only determined by
their payoffs, but also by their hierarchy difference — players in the high rank are more likely to reproduce
their strategies than the peers in the low rank. Through simulating the evolution of Prisoners’ dilemma game
with three different hierarchical distributions: uniform, exponential and power-law, we find that the levels of
cooperation are enhanced in all cases, and the enhancement is optimal in the uniform case. The enhancement
is due to the fact that the presence of hierarchy facilitates the formation of cooperation clusters with high-
rank players acting as the nucleation cores. We also study a two-hierarchy model, where similar cooperation
promotion is revealed and some theoretical analysis are provided. Our finding implies that social hierarchy may
be not that harmful to cooperation than previously thought.
INTRODUCTION
From Confucius to Kant, cooperation is a central concern in
our society not only for its humanity value but also its crucial
role in the development of economy, technology, and science
etc [1]. Cooperation is also ubiquitous in the natural world,
like those prosocial species, such as ants and bees, whose sur-
vivals rely on their altruistic behaviors [2]. But according to
the evolution theory of Darwinism, individuals are inherently
selfish therefore they are only willing to change their strate-
gies or behaviors to maximize their profits. Because defection
generally brings more profits as least in the short term, no one
is willing to cooperate and the world will be dominated by
defectors. How the cooperation emerges and is maintained in
selfish population is then a vitally important question that has
attracted the attention of researchers in different fields in the
past several decades.
In this regard, the evolutionary game theory provides a
proper framework to explore the potential mechanisms be-
hind cooperation [3, 4], and some prototypical game mod-
els are often adopted for this aim, such as the prisoner’s
dilemma [5], the snowdrift game [6, 7] and the public good
game [8] etc. The endeavor has successfully revealed quite
a few mechanisms, such as direct reciprocity [9], indirect
reciprocity [10–12], kin selection [13], group selection, spa-
tial reciprocity [14, 15], voluntary participation [16–18] and
punishment [19, 20]. More recent advance comes from the
methodologies within machine learning to compare what out-
come difference could be if the games are played by AI al-
gorithms [21–23]. Note that, similar to the spirit of identical
particle assumption in statistical mechanics, individuals in all
these models are supposed to be indistinguishable and thus of
equal position in the strategy updating.
However, a consensus is that our society is more often com-
posed by heterogeneous individuals where they differ in many
aspects such as their occupations, social statuses, cultural
backgrounds etc [24] that potentially affect their decision-
makings. The statement is also true in nature, like the reported
examples homing pigeons [25] and white storks [26], where
a small fraction of the group take the lead of decision-making
regarding their movement direction and the soical hierachy
potentially affects their swarming transitions [27]. Recently,
researchers start to consider the impact of non-identical indi-
viduality and find that the population heterogeneity generally
leads to better cooperation outcomes [28–37]. In [28], Perc
et al study the impact of social diversity on the cooperation in
the form of diversified payoff structures, and find that the lev-
els of cooperation are improved in all cases. Social diversity is
also able to promote cooperation in spatial multigames where
two different games are played simultaneously [29]. In [30],
Zhang et al unveil that the popularity-driven selection facili-
tates the formation of cooperator clusters, thus the promotion
of cooperation. A coevolutionary model shows that a moder-
ate popularity works best for boosting cooperation [31]. The
diversity of teaching or learning ability is also found to lift the
level of cooperation generally [32–35]. In addition, positive
correlation between strategy persistence and teaching ability
also provides an approach to promote cooperation [37]. In
[36], hierarchically structured lattices are also studied, where
players on different layers exhibit different levels of coopera-
tion.
A more closely related question is to address how does the
social hierarchy influence cooperation. Some researchers find
that the social hierarchy is detrimental for the evolution of co-
operative behaviors [38], but an experiment work shows that
collaborative hierarchy maintains cooperation in asymmetric
games [39], leading to a contradictory conclusion. Given the
ubiquitous presence of hierarchy in all aspects of society and
nature, it’s crucial to clarify the impact of social hierarchy on
the cooperation prevalence.
Here, we introduce and investigate an evolutionary game
model of a hierarchical population, where each player is des-
ignated a social rank according to some distributions. For
players in the high social rank, their strategies are more likely
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Cooperator fraction fc as a function of temptation b for a couple of hierarchy coefficients α given three different
hierarchical distributions: (a) uniform, (b) exponential, and (c) power-law. The model returns to the original PD game model when α=0. As α
increases, the level of cooperation continuously improves. Other parameters: L = 1024, K = 0.1.
to reproduce in their neighborhood than players in the low
rank, even if their payoffs are close. Specifically, we study the
evolution of prisoner’s dilemma game in three different hier-
archy distributions, and we find that the levels of cooperation
are significantly improved in all cases. The promotion is due
to the hierarchy-induced spatial structures that effectively pro-
tect the survival of cooperators. We also develop a simplified
model to give some analytic treatments.
MODEL
In our model, the system is composed of N individuals that
are located on an L× L square lattice with a periodic bound-
ary condition. Each player is initially set either as a cooperator
or defector with equal probability. They play pairwise game
defined by three scenarios. Mutual cooperation brings each
the reward R, mutual defection yields the punishment P for
each, and mixed encounter gives the cooperator the sucker’s
payoff S yet the temptation T for the defector. Strict pris-
oner’s dilemma (PD) requires T > R > P > S, but here
we adopt the common practice with parameterization R = 1
, P = S = 0, and T = b, which is known as the weak PD
game. To incorporate the hierarchy, each player i is desig-
nated a random hi ∈ [0, 1) at beginning, drawn from some
distributions. Players with higher value of h are supposed to
be in higher rank in the social hierarchy.
In an elementary step of the standard Monte Carlo (MC)
simulation, the procedure is as follows. First, an individual
i is randomly chosen and acquires its payoff Πi by playing
the game with all its neighbors Ωi defined by the underlying
networks. Next, one of i’s neighbors j is selected randomly
and also acquires its payoff Πj by playing the game within its
neigborhood Ωj . Lastly, player i adopts the strategy of j with
an imitation probability according to the Fermi rule [5]
W (sj → si) = 1
1 + exp[(Πi −Πj(1 + α4 h))/K] , (1)
where ∆h = hj − hi ∈ (−1, 1) denotes the hierarchal dif-
ference between i and j. α ∈ [0, 1] is the hierarchal coeffi-
cient determining the degree to which the strategy adoption
in the imitation process is influenced by the hierarchy. Obvi-
ously, the case of α = 0 is recovered to the traditional evo-
lutionary games, where the strategy updating is purely deter-
mined by their payoffs, irrespective of other factors. Instead,
when α > 0, the presence of hierarchical difference facilitates
the strategy reproduction of those players in the high social
rank. K quantifies the uncertainty in decision-making during
the imitation, and is fixed at 0.1 throughout the whole study.
A full MC step consists of N such elementary steps, which
means that every player is going to update its strategy once on
average.
To be specific, we consider the following three distribu-
tions: uniform (∝ const.), exponential (∝ e−2h), and power-
law types (∝ h−1), which are drawn in practice as follows:
h = χ, χ ∈ [0, 1),
h =
1
2
ln(
1
1− χ ), χ ∈ [0, 1−
1
e2
),
h = (
1

)χ−1, χ ∈ [0, 1).
(2)
Here χ are uniformly drawn in the given range, and h ∈ (, 1)
with  → 0 for the last implementation. For most numerical
experiments, 50 thousand MC steps are run to guarantee that
the equilibrium is reached, and then we average the data for
another 10 thousand MC steps.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Color map encoding the cooperator fraction fc on the b − α parameter plane respectively for three different types of
hierarchical distributions: (a) uniform, (b) exponential, and (c) power-law. Other parameters: L = 256, K = 0.1.
RESULTS
Numerical simulations
To begin with, we first present the impact of hierarchy on
the cooperation prevalence in the uniform distribution case.
Fig. 1(a) gives the cooperation phase transitions as the func-
tion of the temptation b for a couple of hierarchical coeffi-
cients α. It shows that as the impact of hierarchy becomes
stronger, the cooperative likelihood is increased. Specifically,
the threshold for cooperation outbreak bc1 (below which co-
operators start to appear) is continuously increased as α be-
comes larger and this shift is the most significant for α = 1.
Meanwhile, the threshold for defector eradication bc2 (below
which defectors go extinct) is also increased, whereby full co-
operation is possible in those strong hierarchy cases for the
given parameter region. For the temptation bc2 < b < bc1 , the
coexistence states of cooperators and defectors are expected.
For comparison, Fig. 1(b) and 1(c) illustrate the phase tran-
sitions of two nonuniform distributions, which show qualita-
tively the same cooperation enhancement. Compared to the
case of uniform distribution, the enhancement is lesser in the
population with exponential and power-law hierarchical dis-
tributions, especially the cooperation promotion is least in the
latter scenario, where the defector eradication threshold bc2 is
not even present in the shown parameter range. But still the
cooperation outbreak thresholds bc1 are shifted to the right and
all prevalences are greater than the case without hierarchical
impact (α = 0).
To more systematically investigate the impact of hierarchy,
Fig. 2 provides the phase diagrams in the b − α parameter
space for the three distributions. It confirms that the coop-
eration is promoted in all cases as the hierarchy coefficient
α becomes larger. In particular, both thresholds bc1,2 are
monotonously shifted and they are almost linear functions of
the hierarchical coefficient α. These results suggest that the
enhancement of cooperation in the hierarchical population is
universal, and the uniform distribution of social ranking com-
paratively yields the optimal promotion of cooperation.
Mechanism analysis
To explore the mechanism underlying the cooperation pro-
motion due to the hierarchy impact, we first provide the time
series of fc with the uniform distribution for three different
α, see Fig. 3. For the given temptation b = 1.05, the frac-
tion of fc gradually decreases as time goes by and becomes
extinct when the hierarchical impact is absent (α = 0). By
contrast, this fraction turns up in the midway after a couple
of MC steps when α increases and stabilizes at some nonzero
values; full cooperation is possible when α further increases
for the given b. The reason for the decay of cooperation at the
early stage is well-known that well-mixed initial population is
more beneficial to defectors that jeopardise the reproduction
of cooperation, and the possible survival of cooperators later
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Time evolution of cooperation fraction fc in
the population with uniform hierarchical distribution. Three hierar-
chical strengths are shown α = 0, 0.5, 1. When α = 0, the case is
recovered into the traditional case without hierarchical impact, where
cooperation is absent. But as the hierarchical impact is involved,
cooperation is possible and even becomes dominating. Parameters:
L = 1024, K = 0.1, and b = 1.05.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Characteristic spatial patterns for α = 0, 0.5, and 1. Red and blue respectively represent cooperators and defectors,
and the snapshots are taken at t = 1, 4, 40, 4000 from left to right columns. When without hierarchy (a-d, α = 0), cooperators gradually die
out; for the middle level of hierarchical impact (e-h, α = 0.5), cooperators survive and their clusters merge into even larger size; for even
stronger impact (i-l, α = 1), cooperation is dominating and the population tends to be full cooperation in the long term. Parameters: L = 128,
K = 0.1, and b = 1.05.
on is due to the formation of cooperator clusters whereby they
support each other and resist against the invasion of defec-
tors at clusters’ boundaries. This suggests that the presence
of hierarchy could better enhances the formation of coopera-
tion clusters than the traditional case without the hierarchical
impact.
To see this, Fig. 4 shows the corresponding characteristic
snapshots to obtain some intuitions. Starting from the same
random initial condition, we observe the densities of coopera-
tions are all reduced in the short term (the second column), but
afterwards some cooperation clusters are starting to form (the
third column). In the upper panels (α = 0), however, these
clusters shrink and disappear in the end. By contrast in the
other two cases (α = 0.5 and 1), they grow up after shrinking,
and some merge with each other to form even bigger clusters,
thus these cooperators are able to survive or even dominating.
To understand how the hierarchy facilitates the formation
of cooperation clusters, it’s crucial to investigate the evolution
dynamics at the interaction boundaries between the cooper-
ator and defector clusters. By the boundary, it is defined as
the time-varying set B(t) of any site with at least one differ-
ent state in its four nearest neighbors. First, let’s monitor the
time evolution of the fraction of boundaries in the population
defined as ns(t)/N , shown in Fig. 5 for three typical hier-
archical cases (α = 0.5, 0.75, 1). The rapid decrease in the
first few steps in all cases is due to reduction of cooperators
starting from the well-mixed condition, followed by a typical
increase due to the formation and growth of cooperation clus-
ters. While the increase saturates in the case of α = 0.5, there
is a nontrivial peak in the cases of α = 0.75 and 1, especially
for boundary cooperators. This reason lies in the fact that in
these cases, many small cooperator clusters further merge into
each other gradually, resulting in bigger ones which then re-
duce the boundaries as well as cooperators or defectors there.
To study the individual difference caused by the hierarchi-
cal rank, we classify all individuals into five subgroups on the
basis of the hierarchical labeling as Lg with g = 1, 2, ..., 5 if
hi ∈ [0, 0.2), [0.2, 0.4), ..., [0.8, 1) respectively. Specifically,
we monitor the evolution of relative composition with respect
to the hierarchy for both cooperators and defectors at bound-
aries, and the relative composition fractions are defined as
fsLg =
nsLg (t)
ns(t)
, s ∈ {C,D}. (3)
Here, nsLg (t) =
∑
i∈BLg (t) δ(si(t)−s) is the number of play-
ers within the state s at the interface belonging to subgroup Lg
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FIG. 5. (Color online) The fraction of all cooperators and defectors at boundaries for three hierarchical strengths α = 0.5, 0.75, 1. At very
beginning, almost all players are at boundaries when starting from random initial conditions. By evolution, the boundary fractions decay and
saturate in the case of α = 0.5 (a), but show nontrivial peaks in α = 0.75 (b) and α = 1 (c). Parameters: L = 1024, K = 0.1, and b = 1.05.
at time t, and ns(t) =
∑5
g=1 n
s
Lg
(t) accordingly.
Fig. 6 further shows the relative hierarchical compositions
fC,DLg respectively for the five subgroups. For boundary coop-
erators, it shows that at the very early stage only the relative
fraction of the highest level of cooperators L5 exhibits obvi-
ous increase. This observation is understandable because for
well-mixed population at this stage defectors are at relatively
advantage position over cooperators, but the high rank for
those cooperators compensates their disadvantageous compet-
itiveness, therefore they survive better than those in lower
subgroups. This explains increasing trend for those higher
rank subgroups of cooperators. Interestingly, this trend is re-
versed as time goes by that cooperators of lower subgroups
are dominating at boundaries and the fraction differences be-
come larger as the hierarchical impact becomes stronger. This
means that in the long term the cooperation clusters are more
likely surrounded by low-rank cooperators; and accordingly
those high-rank cooperators are more probably located within
the center position of cooperation clusters. This is reasonable
because those high-rank cooperators who survive better in the
early phase naturally act as the nucleation core for the growth
of cooperation clusters at the late stage.
The time evolution of composition fractions for defectors,
however, shows some different dynamical features, see the
lower row in Fig. 6. The long term evolution shows quali-
tatively the same property that low-rank defectors dominate at
the interface. But this feature evolves at the very beginning of
evolution unlike the cooperator case. These means that high-
rank defectors are not likely to appear at the interaction inter-
face from the beginning. This difference lies in the fact that
high-rank cooperators act as the core of cooperation clusters
but those high-rank defectors are more often embedded in a
connected defection sea.
To characterize the interaction interface in more details, we
also survey the fractions of cooperators in their neighborhood
centered around players at boundaries. According to both the
state and hierarchy of the center players, we compute the evo-
lution of cooperator fraction in the neighborhood respectively
for cooperator and defector being the center player,
fˆsLg (C)=
∑
i∈BLg (t)
∑
j∈Ωi
δ(si − s)δ(sj − C)
4
∑
i∈BLg (t)
δ(si − s) , s∈{C,D}(4)
where the population is also divided into five subgroups. The
result is shown in Fig. 7. In all cases, the cooperator fractions
first decrease then followed by an increase and saturate in the
end, qualitatively the same as the typical time series shown in
Fig. 3. The most significant observation is that for cooperators
at the boundary higher rank of their social hierarchy convinces
more of their neighbors to be cooperative as well, and vice
versa, while for defectors the opposite is true that higher ranks
lead to much less cooperators in their neighborhood.
Altogether, these observations constitute the following pic-
ture: due to the presence of social hierarchy, those high-rank
cooperators survive from exploitation starting from random
conditions, and they act as the nucleation cores whereby co-
operation clusters grow by attracting more and more low rank
individuals around; at interaction boundaries high-rank co-
operators facilitate the growth of cooperation clusters while
high-rank defectors do the opposite. Without social hierarchy,
the nucleation process is absent in the cases when the tempta-
tion b is large, thus the cooperation cannot be expected.
Finally, to gain some analytical insight into the hierarchy
impact, we adopt a further simplified model, where only two
hierarchies are assumed within the population (i.e. hi ∈
{0, 1}), and the replicator rule is used. The probability of
strategy adoption is as following:
W (sj → si) = max{Πj(1 + α4 h)−Πi
4b(1 + α)
, 0}, (5)
where Πi and Πj are the payoffs of i and j as above. In this
two-hierarchy model, 4h = hj − hi only has three values:
0, ±1. When the effective payoff Πj(1 + α4 h) > Πi, the
player i adopts player j’s strategy with a nonzero probability,
otherwise there is no change in si. The presence of 4b(1+α) is
for the probability normalization. The reason for the adoption
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FIG. 6. (Color online) The time series of relative composition fraction at boundaries fsLg (t) for three hierarchical strengths α = 0.5, 0.75, 1.
(a-c) and (d-f) are respectively for cooperators and defectors. In each subplot, the population is divided into five subgroups according to their
hierarchy, L1,2,...,5 correspond to the lowest to the highest ranks. Other parameters: L = 1024,K = 0.1, and b = 1.05.
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FIG. 7. (Color online) The time series of neighborhood composition fraction at boundaries fˆsLg (t) for three hierarchical strengths α =
0.5, 0.75, 1. (a-c) and (d-f) are respectively for cooperators and defectors. Also, the population is divided into five subgroups. Other parame-
ters: L = 1024, K = 0.1, and b = 1.05.
71 1.05 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.25
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1(a)
C C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
D
D
D
D
(b)
D C
FIG. 8. (Color online) A two-hierarchy model. (a) Color coded frac-
tion of cooperation fc in the parameter b-α space. In particular, the
nearly full cooperation (fc > 0.99) is encircled by white dashed line.
The system evolves 510000 MC steps and the data is the average of
the last 10000 points. Parameters: L = 256, K = 0.1. (b) Two mi-
croscopic schemes for the derivation of full cooperation conditions:
(Left) a low rank defector is surrounded by cooperators with one of
them being of a high rank; (Right) a cluster of defectors encounter
a cluster of cooperators, where the focal defector/cooperator is of
high/low rank. White and black color indicate the social rank being
0 and 1, respectively, and grey sites could be in either rank.
of the replicator rule is because it is more readily for analytical
treatment than the Fermi rule.
Fig. 8(a) shows the results of numerical experiments with
this simplified model, which exhibit qualitatively the same be-
haviors that the presence of hierarchy is able to enhance co-
operation prevalence. In particular, the defector eradication
threshold bc2 is also shown to be a linear function of the hier-
archical parameter α. Though new complexities are revealed
that an upper threshold of full cooperation arises.
To have a stable full cooperation state, one can consider an
extreme case where a single defector as a perturbation is sur-
rounded by a group of cooperators, and find out under what
condition this defector is going to die or at least there is a
possibility for it to be invaded by cooperators of any hierar-
chy, and thus reaching absorbing state of full cooperation is
possible. When this defector is of low rank (hD = 0), a nec-
essary condition is that if one of its cooperator neighbors is
of high rank (hC = 1) and the state transfer probability re-
quires W (C → D) > 0 (shown in the left panel of Fig. 8(b)).
This scheme corresponds to the loosest scenario for defector
extinction. The effective payoffs are 3(1 + α) and 4b respec-
tively for the focal cooperator and defector. This leads to the
following inequality
α > 4b/3− 1. (6)
A tough situation occurs when the defector is of high rank
(hD = 1). Since its effective payoff is higher than its any
cooperator neighbor, it will convince some of its neighbors to
be defectors after a few steps. To become full cooperation,
this defector cluster has to be invadable. The most difficult
scenario in this case is shown in the right panel of Fig. 8(b),
and also W (C → D) > 0 is required. Here the effective
payoffs of the two focal players are respectively 3(1−α) and
b for C and D, and we have
α < 1− b/3. (7)
The equations of the inequality (6) and (7) constitute the
boundaries of the full cooperation region, which are well
matched by numerical results, see the black lines in Fig. 8(a).
But since the analytic boundaries are derived from the nec-
essary conditions, the two boundaries only encircle the full
cooperation region, cannot reproduce its exact boundary.
SUMMARY
In summary, we aim to address how the social hierarchy
could affect the cooperation outcome in the population. In the
numerical experiments, players in high social rank are more
likely to reproduce their strategies than those in low rank even
if they have similar payoffs. By using prisoner’s dilemma with
three different hierarchical distributions, we find that the so-
cial hierarchy boosts cooperation in all cases, which is coun-
terintuitive because previously social hierarchy was thought
to be detrimental for cooperative behaviors [38]. The mecha-
nism for cooperation promotion lies in the fact that the hierar-
chy in the population facilitates the formation of cooperation
clusters that effectively protect the evasion of defection. A
further simplified model provides some analytical insight into
the processes. Our findings may provide an explanation of
the ubiquitousness of social hierarchies and implies that intro-
ducing some degree of hierarchy into the population seems an
optional strategy for institutional design to boost cooperation.
Besides, our work calls for behavioral experiments for further
confirm.
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